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Abstract
Technological progress in the biological sciences is now advancing across such a wide range
and at such a pace, that, irrespective of size, no firm can hope to keep up in all the different
areas. Participating in innovation networks, bundling of competencies and capabilities,
therefore, offers an alternative to extremely expensive go-it-alone strategies, whether carried
out by acquisition and mergers or by isolated R&D. This imbalance between the rate of
growth of the biotechnology knowledge base and the capability of individual firms to access it
can explain the persistence of cooperative R&D in the biotechnology-based sectors at the end
of the 90s. Such imbalance is not due any more only to the lack of absorptive capacity of
existing firms, because the large pharmaceutical firms have meanwhile developed
considerable competencies in that field. This previous competence-gap was considered to be
the reason for cooperative behaviour in the early phases of these industries in the end of the
70s and early 80s. To the extent that this was considered to be the only knowledge gap
innovation networks were considered as a temporary phenomenon, which could not persist
beyond the period required by large firms to catch up with the new technology. We are then
proposing that a new role, that of explorers scanning parts of the knowledge space that LDFs
(Large Diversified Firms) are capable of exploring but unwilling to commit themselves in an
irreversible way, can be played by DBFs (Dedicated Biotechnology Firms) in innovation
networks. Our simulation approach attempts to represent the emergence of these two roles as
endogenous changes in the motivation for participating in innovation networks, allowing them
to become an important and long-lasting organizational device for industrial R&D. Drawing
on a history friendly modeling approach the decisive mechanisms responsible for the
emergence of innovation networks in these industries are figured out and compared to real
developments.
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1. Introduction
Innovation networks are a relatively new phenomenon which emerged in a significant way
only since the beginning of the 1980s.  Not only this new phenomenon was not predicted by
economic theories, but its existence was considered to be an exception. The market and
hierarchical organizations were considered to be the only stable and efficient forms of
industrial organization. Networks were expected to have only a temporary existence or to
survive in special niches. As it often happens, reality has taken science by surprise and the
number of collaborative inter-institutional networks has steadily grown since the 1980s (EU
Indicators Report, 1997). There is then a need to modify existing theories of industrial
organization in order to explain the existence and the features of collaboration networks. The
expression inter-institutional collaboration networks has been used before because the typical
members of these networks are not only firms. Public research institutes or government
departments participate quite often in these networks. Furthermore, in this paper we are only
going to be concerned with innovation networks, that is with networks whose main objective
is to create and adopt innovations. This is no the only type of network, but it is the dominant
one.
In most of the research about networks the increased rate of creation of new knowledge and
the shortening of the life cycles of products are two of the main factors associated with the
existence of networks. Thus mechanisms of knowledge creation and utilization seem to be
playing a very important role in the creation of networks. Networks can be considered a
component of the emerging knowledge based society, in which knowledge is expected to
3become the crucial factor leading to economic growth and to competitiveness. In a knowledge
based society not only the quantity of knowledge used will be greater but its mechanisms of
creation and utilization will change. According to Gibbons et al (1994) a new mode of
knowledge generation and  utilization, called Mode 2, is emerging in addition to the
traditional one called Mode1. While in the latter the creation and utilization are clearly
separated both chronologically and institutionally, in the former there is a continuous
interaction between the two processes, which leads to the need for different institutional and
organizational forms. Networks could then be a form of industrial organization appropriate to
a knowledge based society.
Biotechnology is one of the fields that is at the forefront of the creation of a knowledge based
society. This seems somewhat paradoxical, since it could be maintained that biotechnology is
one of the oldest technologies used by mankind. Beer and yogurt making constitute two
typical examples. However, modern biotechnology has been substantially changed by the
advent of molecular biology, a new discipline which was founded in the 1930s based on the
attempt to apply to biology the methods of physics. In the mid 1970s two discoveries,
recombinant DNA and monoclonal antibodies, transformed a scientific discipline with a
brilliant if distant future into a seedbed of industrial applications. Accordingly some authors
now call this latest vintage of biotechnology third generation, to distinguish it from the
completely empirical first generation and from the second generation, which began with the
production of antibiotics. Second generation biotechnology used scientific methods but it did
not have the knowledge required to change the genetic make-up of organisms. Such
knowledge was only provided in a systematic way by molecular biology. In the mid 1970s
very few research institutions did research in molecular biology and they were mostly in the
USA. The industrial firms that in principle could have exploited molecular biology did not
have a knowledge base or an absorptive capacity for it. Their competencies and knowledge
bases were concentrated in more traditional disciplines such as organic chemistry or
microbiology. In fact, this lack of  knowledge hampered firms’ recognition of the
opportunities that could have been offered by molecular biology.
Biotechnology is not an industrial sector but a scientific field underlying a number of
industrial sectors (pharmaceutical, agriculture, food, environment etc.), here called the
biotechnology based sectors. Industrial applications of biotechnology are highly dependent on
4new scientific developments, even on those that are the result of basic research. Although the
lead times between the discovery of new knowledge and its final embodiment in new products
may be very long, the time between the creation of new knowledge and the funding of
industrial research aimed at its applications is in general very short. Basic research is not
exclusively confined to public research institutions, but it is also carried out by firms. Thus,
both for what concerns its intensity of knowledge utilization and for the mechanisms
employed, biotechnology seems to be a very good example of industrial organization in a
knowledge based society. Of course, the conclusions reached in this paper will depend on the
specificity of biotechnology, but they will also have some general significance for the analysis
of a knowledge based society.
The earliest analyses of networks of collaboration pointed to the possibility that they are only
a temporary form of industrial organization. Such temporary character could be the result of
discontinuities in knowledge generation, for example of the emergence of a new technological
paradigm. It was argued that large diversified firms (LDFs) were committed to the old
paradigm, in which all their competencies were concentrated, and that they could not easily
internalise the new knowledge. Alternatively, LDFs did not have the absorptive capacity
required to internalize the new paradigm and they were not capable of constructing it rapidly.
A new type of industrial actor, small high technology firms, arose to bridge the institutional
gap between public research institutions and LDFs. In the specific case of biotechnology such
firms were called dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs). DBFs were expected to act as
intermediaries between LDFs and public research institutions. In the rest of the paper the
DBFs performing this role will be called translators. In the course of time by collaborating
with DBFs and with public research institutions, LDFs could construct a knowledge base and
an absorptive capacity in biotechnology.  Once this happened the role of DBFs would have
become redundant and industrial organization would return to the traditional dichotomy
between the market and hierarchical organizations.
As it was previously pointed out, the rate of creation of inter-institutional collaborative
networks has been steadily increasing all throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Thus either LDFs
have not internalized the new paradigm constituted by biotechnology or a new role for DBFs
has emerged in innovation networks. The analysis of this problem constitutes one of the main
objectives of the present paper. In the paper a second role for DBFs and thus for networks is
5discussed. By the end of the 1980s LDFs in a number of industrial sectors had acquired a
knowledge base in molecular biology (see for example Grabowski, Vernon, 1994) and yet
they continued to enter into collaborative agreements with DBFs. In this paper we hypothesize
a second role for DBFs, linked to the extremely rapid rate of creation of new knowledge. Even
if LDFs have acquired an absorption capacity for it, the sheer rate of advance is such that no
LDF could keep up with it all. LDFs might thus use agreements with DBFs within networks in
order to keep abreast of new developments that could turn out to have important economic
applications. The alternative course of action for an LDF would be to invest in research in the
same fields of biotechnology. However, with a very high rate of growth of knowledge this
strategy would involve a very heavy, irreversible and risky commitment. The collaboration
with DBFs constitutes a more flexible and reversible strategy. It is to be observed that this role
does not involve a qualitative difference in LDFs’ ability to understand molecular biology, but
only the attempt to reach a better trade-off between readiness to action if promising
developments were to emerge in new subsets of the biotechnology knowledge space and the
sunk costs that need to be faced in order to keep these windows open. Furthermore, it must be
remembered hat the competitive advantage of LDFs is not constituted by their ability to
understand new knowledge but by their capacity to combine the different competencies and
complementary assets required to produce a final product. This second role that can be played
by DBFs will be called of explorers.
In what follows we analyze biotechnology innovation networks with special emphasis on two
types of actors, LDFs and DBFs. We compare the advantages and disadvantages for firms of
going alone strategies and of networking strategies, taking into account the environmental
factors influencing the formation of links between actors. Network formation will be shown to
display a dynamics going beyond a first wave of networks and leading to a re-organization of
the partnerships involved.
2. The Simulation Model
Before beginning to explain the basic structure of our model1 some remarks with respect to
the methodological framework we are adopting are order. In particular, we are going to use
the methodology of the so-called history friendly models, recently introduced by Nelson,
6Winter, Malerba and Orsenigo (1999). History friendly models are designed to capture, in a
stylized form, the mechanisms and factors affecting industry evolution, technological advance
and institutional change detected by empirical scholars of industrial economics, technological
change, business organization and strategy, and other social scientists. Thus history friendly
models can be considered the natural extension to modeling of qualitative and appreciative
theories.
Obviously even in an evolutionary approach simulation models have to introduce a certain
degree of abstraction and cannot reflect reality in all its complexity. The mechanisms built in
the formal model have to be transparent enough, so that the analyst can figure out what are the
causes of the observed effects. Therefore, in the first step of our modeling effort we have to
carefully single out the relevant actors, bring together variables which are effective in the
same direction and combine important developments and possibilities of action. Nevertheless,
adopting the approach of evolutionary economics allows us to put emphasis on crucial
features of innovation processes, such as non-linear dynamics, heterogeneity and true
uncertainty, which are beyond the scope of traditional approaches.
In the following the basic building blocks of our modeling conception are introduced. In
particular, we focus on the way we present the different agents in our model, the way we
capture innovation processes, what we consider to be the prerequisites and consequences of
networking as well as the representation of the economic realm in our simulation.
2.1 The Representation of Agents in the Model
Let us begin with the implementation of the agents. The agents we are explicitly considering
in our model are Large Diversified Firms (LDFs) and Dedicated Biotechnology Firms (DBFs).
They are described in terms of their competencies and capabilities. DBFs possess
technological competencies while LDFs possess a mixture of economic and technological
competencies.
                                                                                                                                                        
1 A comprehensive formal description of the simulation model can be found under http://www.uni-
7- Competencies
Technological competencies are considered to be the components of the knowledge base
required for building up production and innovation capabilities in a specific technology. In
other words, before firms are able to develop new marketable outputs they have to develop the
respective bio-technological competencies. Furthermore, technological competencies alone
are not sufficient to achieve economic success with a new product. Economic competencies
are necessary in order to successfully produce and market a new commodity. Examples of
these economic competencies are experience in clinical trials, distribution channels and so on.
Clearly this representation is somewhat simplified. The full range of competencies required by
firms to conceive, develop, produce and market new products is very large and heterogeneous.
However, given that most DBFs at the beginning of their life cycle do not possess any
economic competencies and that LDFs in the 1970s were generally unable to acquire the
knowledge required to use modern biotechnology, the representation in terms of technological
and economic competencies adequately describes the difference between our two main agents.
Moreover, we could consider technological competencies as the core competencies (Prahalad,
Hamel, 1990) of firms and economic competencies as a large part of the complementary assets
(Teece, 1986) required to produce and market a product.
The building up of technological Bit and economic competencies ECit  is described in
equations (1) and (2) respectively:
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Bit := technological competencies of firm i at time t
ECit := economic competencies of firm i at time t
NCOPit := number of cooperations of firm i at time t
tBIO/ECO := time spent in particular activity
Figure 1 shows this function graphically for the case of technological competencies. In the
early phases the building up of the knowledge base is a difficult process and progress is hard
to achieve. However, after having developed a certain knowledge base it becomes easier to
learn even more (threshold effect). Finally, marginal progress becomes progressively more
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8difficult as the knowledge frontier existing at a given time is approached. A function of this
type implies variable returns to investment in the creation of new knowledge within a given
field: very low at the beginning, positive and growing in the intermediate phase before
diminishing returns set in as the potential of the new field has been exploited. The process of
building up a knowledge base in biotechnology is supported by cooperative arrangements with
firms who are already active in this field - an important part of the respective knowledge base
is transferred by networking.
Fig. 1 Building up of a knowledge base in biotechnology
- Discrimination between LDFs and DBFs2
The two populations of firms which can be observed in the biotechnology-based industries
can be distinguished on the basis of their relative technological and economic competencies.
The first population of firms is that of LDFs, for example the large established pharmaceutical
firms. Until the end of the 70s their research and development was mainly embedded in the
paradigm of traditional organic chemistry. The coming up of the new bio-technological
paradigm meant a competence-destroying technological progress3 for them, as most of their
competencies were threatened by the new ones. In our simulation this group of firms is
represented in the starting distribution with well developed economic competencies but with
almost no technological competencies in biotechnology.
                                                
2 See e.g. Acharya, R. (1999), pp. 15 ff.
3 Tushman, M. L., Anderson, P. (1986).
9In the second population we find small start-up companies, often university spin-offs
specialized in the biotechnology field. This group of firms, the so-called dedicated-
biotechnology-firms or DBFs, by their very nature have highly developed technological
competencies, but almost no economic competencies. When they start their existence DBFs
depend on external funds for research and development. Accordingly, in our starting
distribution they are represented just as having no economic competencies but highly
developed technological competencies.
- Venture Capital Firms and Universities
In addition to these firms that we are explicitly taking into account, we also consider two
further important groups of actors in our model: public research institutes or university labs
and venture capital firms. In order to keep our model simple their behavior is not explicitly
analyzed, but they are considered as an important component of the external environment of
biotechnology firms. For example, in order to acquire the funds necessary to undertake R&D a
DBF can cooperate either with a LDF or with a venture capital firm; similarly, the cooperation
of a LDF with a DBF or with a public research institute leads almost to the same
consequences for the LDF etc.
- Capabilities
Drawing on their competencies firms can accumulate technological capabilities in specific
fields which allow them to explore the technological opportunity space. The firms in our
model act in an environment which continuously force them to be engaged in such R&D
processes. Not to innovate means to fall behind in the competitive environment of
biotechnology. In order to increase the probability of an innovation firms accumulate
technological capabilities in the course of time according to equation (3):
(3) C ri
t
i
t
t
= .
Cit := capabilities of firm i at time t
Rit := R&D investment of firm i at time t
Together with the technological competencies Bit the technological capabilities determine the
probability of an innovation Prit which is described in equation (4):
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Prit := innovation probability of firm i at time t
To consider the intrinsic uncertainty of innovation processes the innovation probability of a
firm is matched every period with a Poisson-distributed random number whose mean value is
asymptotically reached by Prti. A firm is successful in its innovative efforts only if the
innovation probability Prti  is above the random number. 4
However, technological capabilities are not sufficient for the successful introduction of a new
product. To do this a firm also needs to acquire economic capabilities Eti as well as the
economic competencies ECit, e.g. in production, legal approval, marketing, distribution etc.
The economic capabilities are accumulated in the same way as the technological capabilities
and are responsible for incremental innovations on new technological trajectories opened up
by a product innovation.
- R&D decision rules
The investment in R&D is no longer guided by an optimization calculus, but by a routinized
behavior, as innovation goes hand in hand with true uncertainty.5 Firms adopt certain rules,
for example, invest x% of your turnover in R&D, retain x% of your financial support in order
to build up an own capital stock etc. In the same way the distribution amongst different
activities (e.g. between investing in the building up of technological or economic capabilities)
is captured by referring to routines.
2.2 Networking
In order to carry out their innovation processes firms can choose different strategies. They can
either decide to go-it-alone, which means not to draw on external knowledge sources and not
to share their own new know-how with potential competitors, or they can decide to cooperate
with other actors and build up collectively the new capabilities necessary for the introduction
of a new commodity. Innovation networks emerge by this mutual cooperation, which gives
                                                
4 In this respect, a major methodological advantage of simulation studies shows up in the construction of the
innovation processes. Whereas in traditional optimization models there is no difference between the modeler and
the modeled agents, simulation analysis allows programming random numbers their statistical distribution is
unknown to the agents in the model (see Pyka, A. (1999, pp. 189 ff.)).
5 E.g. Nelson, R. R., Winter, S. G. (1982), p. 132.
11
rise to channels for knowledge flows between the firms participating in the network. In
particular, we are considering the evolution of innovation networks at three levels within the
model: the environmental conditions favoring or inhibiting the growth of networks, the
individual decisions of firms to cooperate or not, and a matching process bringing together
firms willing to cooperate. This process creates a population of networks with its own
dynamics. The formation of any network constitutes an act of birth or entry into the
population. Conversely, the disappearance of a network constitutes an act of death or exit. The
dynamics of birth and death of networks will be determined by the specific features of each
network and by some features of the external environment. Accordingly we can calculate the
probabilities of birth (PtB) and of death (PtD) that will contribute to the net probability of
network creation (PtN).
- Probability of Birth
A number of environmental factors increase the probability of birth innovation networks. The
growing complexity of innovation processes as well as a high degree of technological
uncertainty play the most important role. Every time a firm is successfully introducing an
innovation the number of knowledge fields #KB is assumed to grow. Given the
complementary and combinatorial nature6 of biotechnology, the technological space Ω ,
defined as the number of possible combinations of knowledge fields, increases in a nonlinear
way (equation (5) and Fig. 2).
(5) 
)!2(#!2
!#
−
=Ω
KB
KB
Ω := technological space
#KB := number of different knowledge fields
Fig.2: Increasing technological Space
Ω
#KB
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Especially in the early phases of a technological life cycle (TLC) this increasing complexity is
combined with a high technological uncertainty because specific research techniques or
heuristics – e.g. how to handle this complexity - are not yet developed. In the model the phase
of a technological life cycle is approximated very roughly by the average age of the different
commodities on the product markets.
Additionally, R&D networks are dependent on a number of core technologies or core/central
actors (MN), who play a crucial role for the establishment of the networks.7 In our model the
population of LDFs is supposed to play this role. These factors influence the probability of
birth of innovation networks PtB and are summarized in equation (6). The functional form of
Eq 6 implies a sigmoid relationship, shown in fig. 3.
(6) Pt
B
const
TL
M N
t
N N
t
=
+ − ⋅ ⋅
1
1 1exp( )Ω
,
PtB := probability of birth of innovation networks
TL := age of technology life cycle
MtN := number of core actors
NtN := number of networking firms.
Fig.3: Probability of birth of innovation networks
In other words, the probability of birth of innovation networks increases with the complexity
of the technological space and with the number of core actors, and it decreases with the age of
the technological life cycle.
                                                                                                                                                        
6 Staropoli, C. (1998), p. 15.
7 See e.g. Saviotti (1996), pp. 36-37.
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- Probability of death of innovation networks
In addition to the previous network supporting effects, other influences decrease the
probability of network formation, thus leading to network death. First, the degree of
competition is crucial in this respect. In our model we use as an economic framework a
heterogeneous oligopoly. We consider the degree of substitutability of the final products as a
measure for the intensity of competition. We use the variance σat of the variables describing a
firm’s relative product quality aijt as a measure of the product heterogeneity: the higher this
variance, the lower is the competitive threat between the firms. Furthermore, we can expect
demand saturation  to decrease the rate of growth of the respective markets and thus the scope
of cooperative R&D. In this phase of the industry life cycle minor improvements of the
technology could lead to considerable advantages for a single firm. To capture this influence,
we draw again on the life cycle TLC and assume that on later stages of this life cycle the rate
of growth of demand is likely to decrease. Finally, the techno-economic performance of the k
network members, again approximated by the relative quality ak
t
k
compared to the average
performance of all firms a t , is itself an indicator for the attractiveness of joining a network.
In cases where the performance of network members is below average performance of the
whole firm population, the networking strategy significantly loses attractiveness. These factors
are summarized in equation (7) in the probability of network death PtD:
(7) P a a TLD
t t
k
t
k a
t= ⋅ −
  ⋅ ⋅α
σ
1 ,
PtD := probability of network death.
a t  := average quality at time t
ak
t
k
:= average quality of cooperating firms
σa
t  := heterogeneity on product markets.
The net probability PtN  of network creation at any given time is determined by the balance of
births and deaths. The value of PtN in our firm population determines the decision of firms to
engage or not to engage in cooperation:
(8)
2
1 tD
t
Bt
N
PPP −+= ;
PtN := net probability of innovation networks.
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In cases where PtN is below 0.5, 2⋅(0.5- PtN)⋅100% of firms previously engaged in cooperation
turn away from cooperation, if PtN is above 0.5, 2⋅(PtN-0.5)⋅100% of firms engage in further
networking. Accordingly, the probability PtN determines the number of firms who decide to
cooperate or not in every period t.
- Networking Decisions
Next, the firms have to decide whether they want to cooperate or not. Generally two forms of
cooperation are possible:
i) cooperation focussing on complementary assets, i.e. firms are induced to cooperate to
acquire technological or economic competencies that they do not posses but that they
judge crucial for their economic success.
ii) cooperation focussing on general complementarities (i.e. the bundling of R&D efforts
in a specific direction) and synergies (i.e. detecting potentials for cross-fertilization by
the combination of different technological capabilities). It is to be noted that in this
case cooperating firms can have competencies with a degree of overlap than in case i).
For example, it is possible to conceive a division of labour in which firms pursue
similar objectives using similar competencies, but they collaborate in order to speed up
the innovation process and to spread the relative uncertainty over the network.
In the form of cooperation i) DBFs play the role of translators, while in form ii) they play the
role of explorers. Consequently, the networking decision depends on the respective
competencies and capabilities that firms have accumulated. For example, a small start-up
DBF in its early phases is not able alone to raise funds for R&D and necessarily has to look
for a partner in order to obtain funding. In the same way established LDFs which want to
become active in the promising fields of biotechnology but have no internal technological
competencies  need collaboration partners experienced in these fields. On the other hand,
firms with highly developed capabilities would not run the risk and share their knowledge
with potential competitors in the stages immediately preceding the introduction of an
innovation. The networking decisions are summarized in figure 4.
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- Matching Process
Finally, we have to decide on the mechanism which brings together different firms willing to
cooperate. Although different mechanisms are conceivably we think that a mechanism which
could be labeled success-breeds-success8 is best suitable for our purposes. Success-breeds-
success means that firms would tend to pick collaborators with the highest technological
and/or economic capabilities. We are here assuming that firms are in able to advertise their
own capabilities and to value those of potential cooperating partners. This seems to be a
realistic assumption, especially in the biotech industry, where firms are ranked on the basis of
their technological performance, which is advertised by press announcements, publications,
patents and even  by the professional standing of the scientists hired by firms, including the
Nobel prize winners present in their scientific committee.
2.3 Networking Consequences
After having introduced the way firms get together in innovation networks we now have to
focus on the consequences of networking. By entering into a collaboration firms are
exchanging their know-how. This means that firms can benefit from the efforts of other firms
in order to build up their own capabilities.
- Absorptive Capacities
The extent to which a firm can benefit from the knowledge flow available by cooperation
depends on its absorptive capacity9. In turn, absorptive capacity is expected to increase with
the firm's previous experience in cooperation. This is represented by the experience term tiδ ,
which describes the amount of external competencies a firm is able to integrate – a kind of
absorptive capacity in networking. This means that external knowledge is not easily integrated
within the own knowledge stock, but certain prerequisites have to be fulfilled and a minimum
amount of experience is necessary. This also means that the amount of knowledge which
flows within the network is severely limited. The building up of the absorptive capacity is
given in equation (9) where we draw on a firm's experience in cooperation as an
approximation:
                                                
8 Phillips, A. (1971).
9 See Cohen/Levinthal (1989) and Cantner/Pyka (1998).
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(9) ti
t
i NCOP⋅= αδ ,
δit := absorptive capacities of firm i at time t.
- Coordination Costs
Cooperation also involves costs, which reduce R&D investments. If it were not for these costs
we would get the unrealistic situation where everybody cooperates with everybody else. These
costs together with the prevailing environmental conditions determine the potential number of
collaborations in the industry while the decision rule described above determine the form of
cooperation chosen. However, as in reality not all firms are engaged in cooperative
relationships with all other firms, there also have to be certain limits to a cooperative strategy.
An important factor limiting the growth of networks are the coordination costs, crti , which
immediately appear together with cooperative R&D. We assume these coordination costs to
be constant and equal for every form of cooperation.10 These costs of cooperating with other
firms decrease the budget for direct research rti, since there is a trade-off between engagement
in acquiring internal and external knowledge. Equation (10) shows this constraint:
(10) Rti = rti + NCOPit ⋅ crti;
Rti := gross R&D budget of firm i at time t
crit := coordination costs.
Therefore, in deciding whether to engage in cooperative R&D or not firms also consider these
coordination costs crti. For a firm i engaged in several cooperative relationships, coordination
costs amount to NCOPit ⋅ crti . They should not exceed a certain percentage η of the gross
R&D-budget tiR . Accordingly, the following decision rule (11) has to be considered by a firm
additionally to the decision which specific form of cooperation it prefers:
(11) if NCOP cr R then no further cooperation is intended
else NCOP cr R then new cooperations are possible
i
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i
t
i
t
i
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i
t
⋅ ≥ ⋅
⋅ < ⋅
η
η
- Financial Flows
Start-up DBFs with missing economic competencies cannot finance their own R&D and are
obliged to find a cooperation partner. In this case an LDF cooperating with a DBF is supposed
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to provide the required research funding. For a DBF i cooperating with an LDF j this means
that its gross R&D budget Rit is financed in a part by the other firm's R&D budget. Of course,
the DBF i will also retain a certain percentage κ of the funds as profits ((1-κ)Rit =rjt) thereby
acquiring means which in future allow it to undertake R&D more independently. In the case
of a successful innovation, the intellectual property rights belong to the LDF j which can start
with the production on the final good markets.
Another possibility for DBFs to acquire R&D funds is to apply for venture capital, for which
we assume an exogenous supply VCt VC= ⋅ +0 1( )α growing with the rate α. Accordingly the
number of firms which can be financed by venture capital is nVC
t VCt
R
= ( R := constant
periodically paid amount of money). Also, we assume a constant period tVC  , so that the
overall credit for a firm is tVC R⋅ . Access to venture capital is competitive. Amongst the firms
applying only those which show the best record in bio-technological capabilities Cit as well as
in previous cooperations NCOPit are funded.
- Knowledge Flows
One of the most important advantages of participating in an innovation network is the access
to channels of knowledge flow. External knowledge exerts an impact on the innovation
probability function and depends on the amount of absorptive capacities, as well as on the
technological capabilities of the cooperating firms. For a firm participating in an innovation
network and collaborating with k other firms the innovation probability function gets
modified:
(12) Pr expi
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
k
t
k
B C C= − − ⋅ + ⋅ 1 δ ,
Ck
t
k
:= capabilities of k cooperation partners.
Thus, participating in an innovation network exerts a threefold influence: first, the research
budget of a firm is reduced due to coordination costs and, in the case of a cooperation with a
DBF, by the financial support of this firm. Second, absorptive capacities are positively
influenced by entering into a new collaboration as the experience with integrating external
                                                                                                                                                        
10 One also can consider the coordination costs to depend on the number of cooperations i.e. first they are
decreasing (economies of scale in cooperating) and then they are increasing again after having passed a certain
threshold.
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knowledge is increasing. Finally, external knowledge becomes available via knowledge flows
between the collaborating firms.
2.4 Competition Processes
The innovative activities of firms are undertaken in an economic environment which is
characterized by a certain degree of competition. On the one hand, the firms offering products
on the final market compete with each other in attracting demand. Also, those firms whose
aim is to offer new technological knowledge compete in a particular way with other firms in
acquiring the respective funds. Finally, firms who want to buy the respective knowledge also
compete for the cooperation with the most attractive research laboratories.
The two levels of competition take place in two different market: the market for final products
and the market for knowledge. Of course, we know that markets for knowledge cannot exist
due to their imperfections. However, the existence of DBFs, which very often though not
always function as contract research organizations, implies that within particular
circumstances such imperfections can be reduced to a level where a market for knowledge,
although very imperfect, can exist. In fact, cooperation often exists between firms operating in
different markets (e.g. for final goods and for knowledge) and thus being in a complementary
relationship. Of course, this does not exclude that firms operating in the same market can
cooperate.
On the final markets firms compete in terms of prices and quality which are, in a dynamic
context, determined by their innovative success. Generally, one would expect that a successful
innovator will be able to attract demand away from its competitors because consumers can
choose between several goods. These substitution effects are due to price and quality changes
which are the results of the following actions and reactions:
• Introducing a new product with improved quality characteristics creates additional demand
allowing the innovator to charge higher prices.
• In the case of an introduction of a new product by two or more vertically integrated firms
who cooperated in the R&D stages the increase in demand is divided between the involved
firms.
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• As a reaction to this quality-induced substitution effect, non-innovators in related markets
lower their prices in order to keep the loss in demand as small as possible.
• Exploitation of technological opportunities of an already existing technology allows the
respective innovator to reduce its price, thereby increasing the demand for his product;
• As a reaction, non-innovators could fight their loss in demand by also lowering their prices,
thereby, however, reducing their profit margin.
Another form of competition takes place in finding the most attractive network partner which
is described with the help of the notion success-breeds-success (see above). Firms engaged in
the search for a cooperation partner will match with those which show either the most
developed technological or the most developed economic competencies.
By choosing a heterogeneous multi-product oligopoly11 we allow for the relationships
described above. Firms are offering their goods on a heterogeneous product market. By an
innovation and the introduction of a new commodity on these markets the relative market
share of the already existing goods gets eroded. By this, we also generate the endogenous
incentives of the firms to engage in innovation, as they cannot survive in the long run by
relying on their original established positions which are continuously threatened by the
innovative actions of their competitors.
2.5 The Basic Structure of the Model
The following flow chart summarizes the basic structure of our model.12 Starting with firms
and industry characteristics of the previous round firms have to decide whether to go-it-alone
or to cooperate. They are influenced by environmental conditions either favoring or inhibiting
the growth of networks. After having found a cooperation partner in the matching process the
firms enter the innovation stages which on the one hand influence the industry and firm
characteristics, and on the other hand the market outcomes of the next round.
                                                
11 See Kuenne (1992) and for an application in a simulation model Cantner/Pyka (1998).
12 In the appendix a comprehensive description of the simulation model following the different stages of the flow
chart can be found.
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Fig. 5: Flow chart
3. The models results
The first simulation experiments are dealing with a purely theoretical case where we are
considering a population of 12 firms, four of them being LDFs and eight DBFs. This step
seems to be necessary to introduce to the model’s results. Therefore, these first simulation
results have to be seen as interim results demonstrating the basic functioning of our model as
well as the plausibility of the implemented relationships and dynamics. In section 4 the
network related results are then compared to real figures in a history friendly manner.
Firm & Industry
Characteristics at time
t-1
Decision to
Cooperate or
not at time t &
R&D budget
Environmental
conditions for
networking at
time t-1
Matching
process at
time t
Innovation
process:
stage I
Innovation
process:
stage II
Final
product
markets
Innovation
consequences
 at time t
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Before analyzing the development of the network structure we begin with the environmental
conditions and some figures describing the typical course of single firms. In figure 6 we see
how the number of successful innovations develop.
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Fig. 6: Number of innovations
The first 50 periods are characterized by a slow introduction of innovations. During these
periods firms are mainly occupied with building up the prerequisites to cope with the
technological progress. The rate of creation of innovations starts accelerating only after period
45. During this period firms build up the required technological competencies and experience
in networking (absorptive capacities). The introduction of innovations accelerates even
further around period 55, where nearly after every second period a new commodity appears on
the markets.
In figure 7 we find the development of the average age of the industry life cycle. The average
age of the population of innovations introduced increases at a faster pace during the first 40
periods due to the slow rate of introduction of novelties. However, as innovative activity starts
accelerating at the end of this period, the average age of innovations starts oscillating around a
mean of 40. The aging process is thus reduced and with it the negative impacts on the
incentives to collaborate. Later on, around period 165 the average age is increasing again
which is caused by the co-existence of a larger variety of commodities introduced at different
times. Here we find again the alternating sequence of low, growing and diminishing returns
already found for the probability of network creation.
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Fig. 7: Average age of the industry life cycle
Both effects determine the environmental conditions for networking. During the first 40
periods the combination of an increasing age of the industry life cycle and a relatively low rate
of introduction of innovations worsens the environmental conditions for networking. After
period 60 the increasing rate of creation of innovations favors the growth of networks, which
can mainly be traced back to an increasing technological space. This effect even outweighs the
further aging of the industry life cycle in later periods.
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Fig. 8: Environmental conditions
Figure 9 shows the corresponding development of the network density. After a first increase in
the density the dynamics of network growth come to a rest after around 10 periods, and even
starts slightly decreasing until period 45. However, after that period network density starts
increasing again, until it begins to oscillate around a value which is twice the average at the
beginning. This can already be interpreted as evidence for the changed role of DBFs, which in
the first periods find temporary collaboration partners in the population of LDFs. These
collaborations are mainly oriented towards bridging the gap between the new bio-technologies
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and the established industry. Later on, however, the DBFs are finally considered as an
extension of internal R&D facilities, allowing LDFs to explore a wider opportunity space.
Therefore, collaborations become more frequent and lasting in more advanced states of the
industry evolution.
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Fig. 9: Network density
This interpretation of the changed role of DBFs is supported when we analyze the
developments at the firm level. Fig. 10 shows the process of building up of technological
competencies by four LDFs. All of them begin with no technological competencies in
biotechnology, but have to build them up by collaborating with firms specialized in these
fields, namely DBFs. Two of the firms engage early in collaboration (thin curves) while the
other two (bold curves) start only at a later stage. The two firms engaging early in
collaboration improve more rapidly their competencies and accordingly reach sooner the
second branch of the learning curve, with positive but decreasing rates. These firms develop
considerable competencies in biotechnology more than 20 periods earlier than the two slow
ones. We can observe that both for the fast and slow collaborating LDFs the shape of the
learning curve is sigmoid and that the saturation level seems to be the same. From these
results it seems that no penalty needs to be paid for  late entry. While this result my depend on
some features of our model that deserve further investigation, they are limited to learning and
they do not take into account possible barriers of other types that might be created during the
technological life cycle.
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Fig. 10: The building up of technological competencies by LDFs
This building up of competencies has an immediate effect on the innovation probability,
which is guided by the exponential relationship of equation (12) with positive but decreasing
rates. Figure 11 shows the development of innovation probabilities of three DBFs (thin lines)
and three LDFs (bold lines) in the starting periods.
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Fig. 11: Accumulation of innovation probabilities
The DBFs are able to accumulate quickly their innovation probabilities depending on their
success in acquiring resources for R&D through. One of the three firms is even able to
introduce a first innovation and to begin developing a second one go within the period shown
in figure 11. Compared to DBFs, the population of LDFs is confronted with severe difficulties
in exploiting their first trajectories. They need a considerably longer time to build up their
technological competencies to the level required to innovate. Of course, this varies depending
on the LDFs networking strategy. However, in general LDFs need more time to reach
promising innovation capabilities. In the early period of biotechnology they depend on
collaborations with firms from the population of DBFs in order to access the technological
space offered by this new field.
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In section 2 we argued that the persistence of innovation networks in the biotechnology-based
industries could not be explained by means of only one role played by DBFs. Whereas in early
stages the small technology-oriented firms play the role of translators, facilitating the
absorption of the new technologies by LDFs, in later stages they become more emancipated as
collaboration partners. This means that they do no longer serve solely as institutions
transferring knowledge between academic and industrial research, but become explorers,
allowing LDFs to investigate a broader technological portfolio in an increasing complex
technological opportunity space. This changed role of the DBFs accordingly has to be
observed also in the simulation as a development which endogenously takes place within our
model’s specification. In figure 12 we therefore plot the specific composition of collaborative
agreements.
LDF/DBF DBF/DBF
t
# Cooperations: LDF/DBF and DBF/DBF
Fig. 12: Composition of collaborations
In the first part of the period investigated only cooperative arrangements between LDFs and
DBFs are found: DBFs are supposed to support LDFs in building up their biotechnology
competencies; and, as a compensation for their R&D efforts, they are funded by LDFs. As
soon as some DBFs start to earn their own money they also initiate further collaborations in
which they are no longer playing the role of translators but that of explorers. In the simulation
we find that these collaborations between DBFs to become of increasing importance in later
stages of the simulated time horizon. Now, the cooperative agreements aim at bundling know-
how and joint exploration of the technological opportunities. At the end of the period studied
the number of agreements between DBFs is becoming comparable to that of agreements
between LDFs and DBFs.
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This changed role played by DBFs is also mirrored in the decisions made by firms with
respect to their collaboration policy. In the model we differ between three strategies: the go-it-
alone strategy chosen by firms who are either at the technological frontier and don’t want to
share know-how with followers or by firms which already are engaged in several
cooperations. The second strategy aims at attracting research funds; this strategy is adopted by
the DBFs in their early phases, when they enter the scene with highly developed technological
competencies but they have no economic competencies. Finally, the third strategy aims at the
integration of external knowledge in order to build up jointly in a network the capabilities
necessary for the introduction of an innovation.
no cooperation translator explorer
w illingness to start a new  collaboration and strategy choice
t
%
Fig. 13: Strategy choices
Fig. 13 shows the share of strategy choices the firms (LDFs and DBFs) make with respect to
the specific form of cooperation they want to initiate. This decision, of course is always
influenced by the position of the firm, in particular depending on whether the firm is already
engaged in one or more cooperations. Therefore, the white area representing the proportion of
firms who don’t want to start a new cooperations has to grow with the number of already
existing networks because of the increasing coordination costs. In the early stages almost all
firms wish to start new cooperative relationships according to the translator’s type (black
shaded area). With the growing diffusion of technological competencies within the population
of LDFs and as some successful DBFs become vertically integrated producers, this decision
shifts nearly exclusively to collaborative relationships following the explorer’s type (grey
shaded area). This also means, that the new collaborative agreements to be started in later
periods will almost only be of this latter type which is in line with the results shown in figure
12.
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4. Comparing artifical and real networks
We can compare our artifical world with developments of the real world. In order to get a first
idea of the respective artifical data, four selected periods are freeze framed in figure 14.
3 DBF1 DBF2 DBF3 DBF4 DBF5 DBF6 DBF7 DBF8
LDF1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
LDF2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
LDF3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDF4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a)
48 DBF1 DBF2 DBF3 DBF4 DBF5 DBF6 DBF7 DBF8
LDF1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
LDF2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
LDF3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
LDF4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
DBF2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b)
75 DBF1 DBF2 DBF3 DBF4 DBF5 DBF6 DBF7 DBF8
LDF1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDF2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDF3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDF4 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
DBF1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
DBF4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c)
95 DBF1 DBF2 DBF3 DBF4 DBF5 DBF6 DBF7 DBF8
LDF1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
LDF2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
LDF3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
LDF4 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
DBF1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
DBF3 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
DBF4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
DBF6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DBF7 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
DBF8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
d)
Fig. 14: Network structure for selected periods. Each gray box represents the collaboration of
the firms corresponding to it on the horizontal and vertical axes.
Ad 14a) In the starting periods cooperations are focused on acquiring complementary assets,
i.e. DBFs are looking for financial powerful partners whereas LDFs are looking for
technologically interesting partners with core competencies in biotechnology. In this
situation we end up with all firms in the population of DBFs collaborating with one or
two partners out of the population of LDFs.
Ad 14b) In this period most of the early cooperations are terminated. This is caused mainly by
two effects. On the one hand, a decreased network probability caused by an advanced
age of the first technology life cycle leads to a canceling of less successful
collaborations. On the other hand, some collaborations have led to an innovation and
are terminated afterwards. As there are new collaborations, a re-orientation with
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respect to the selection of partners has taken place. LDF2 still participates a network
with two DBFs and also LDF3 has increased his cooperative engagement by now
cooperating with two DBFs. The most significant change has taken place with respect
to DBF1 which obviously was successful in becoming a vertically integrated supplier.
This firm no longer collaborates with any LDF but instead has built up a network with
three other DBFs (DBF2, DBF3, DBF4).
Ad 14c) When we look at the networking table of period 75 the situation has changed once
more. Now we only find 4 collaborative agreements and none of the early cooperations
is still in existence, however LDF4 and DBF2 are again collaborating in a network.
This change is mainly caused by successful innovations as well as a still slow
improvement of the environmental conditions for networking.
Ad 14d) In later stages (period 95) most of the indicators support the emergence of innovation
networks and accordingly we find a dense network between LDFs and DBFs and
between those DBFs who were successful in becoming vertically integrated producers
(DBF1, DBF2, DBF3). Also, all of our four LDFs are engaged again in eight different
collaborations supporting our hypothesis that the role of DBFs is changing from
translators to explorers in the course of time making innovation networks a persistent
phenomenon.
The results on the network dynamics of our artifical biotechnology industries are at a first
glance difficult to compare with data from the real world. In figure 15 we find for a single
period (1998) a small selection of collaborations between LDFs and DBFs. However, graph
theory13 offers some measures to compare different networks from a structural perspective.14
These measures describe, for example, the adjacency, the reachability and the connectivity of
a network as well as the centrality of single actors.15 By comparing these figures we will get
some first insights whether we have caught the basic mechanisms of networking in our
industries, or where we have to modify specific components of our model in order to improve
our understanding.
                                                
13 See e.g. Burt, R. S. (1980).
14 An interesting application of graph theory on biotechnology innovation networks is in: Pammolli, F.,
Riccaboni, M. (1999).
15 See e.g. Freeman, L. C. (1979).
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LDF/DBF AHP Bayer Boeh.Ingel. DupontMerck EliLilly GlaxoWellc. Hoechst Ro-che Merck&Co Novar-tis Pfi-zer SKB Warn.Lamb. Ze-neca
Affymax 2 1 1 1 2
Affymetrix 1 2 1
ArQule 2 1
Britisch Biotech. 1 2 1 1 2
Celltech 1 2 2
Chiron 1 1 1 1
CoCensys 1 1 1
Human Genom Sci. 1 3
Incyte Pharma. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Millenium Bio Therap. 1 2 1
Neurogen 1 3
Onyx 1 1 2
Repligen 1 1 2 1 2
Scios 1 1 1 1 1
Sequana Therap. 1 1 1 1
SIBIA 1 1 1
Xenova 2
Fig. 15: Collaborations in the biotechnology-based industries16 (own datasources)
In the following we have applied three concepts, in particular the average distance, a network
centralization index and the degree of centrality in order to compare time series of artifical
networks with real networks. The computations are done with Ucinet17, a software tool
designed for network analysis.
Fig. 16 shows the development of the average distance, a measure for the average shortest
path between two nodes for our artifical network as well as for our empirical database. This
measure can be interpreted as an indicator for the diffusion of information in a network.
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Fig. 16a: Average distance in the artifical world
                                                
16 In total this is 113x704 matrix with around 1350 entries which exists for the years 1977 - 1999.
17 Bogatti, S. P. et al. (1999).
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real world average distance
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Fig. 16b: Average distance in the real world
First it is obvious that the scale of this measure is significantly larger for the real world
compared to the simulated world. However, this measure is an absolute one and depends also
on the size of a network. Therefore, the difference in scale can mainly be traced back to the
difference in network sizes. Nevertheless, both figures show a structural similarity in a
sequence of peaks which indicate a qualitative change in the network structure. Whereas these
peaks grow in magnitude in the real world, their artifical counterpart stays almost on the same
level and also the second peak is unimodal in the real world compared to the bimodal peak in
the artifical world.
artificial world network centralization index
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Fig. 16a: Network centralization index of the artifical world
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real world network centralization index
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Fig. 16b: Network centralization index of the real world
To rule out the influence of network size, index oriented measures exist. In figure 17 we apply
the so-called network centralization index which can be interpreted as a measure for the
influence of core actors in a network. Again we find a sequence of peaks for both worlds
which now are higher in magnitude in the artifical world. This difference in the impact can
still be traced back to the different sample size: in the artifical world we consider for the
moment only four LDFs which very likely play the role of core actors. Accordingly their
relative impact in a population of 12 firms is likewise higher compared to a real world firm
population of almost 1000 firms.
Finally we measured and calculated the degree centrality for both of our worlds. The degree
centrality measures the asymmetry in the roles played by various actors in a network.
artificial world degree of centrality
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Fig. 18a: Degree of centrality in the artifical world
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real world degree of centrality
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Fig. 18b: Degree of centrality in the real world
Also for this aspect of network activity we find a broad correspondence of our artifical and
real worlds. The sequence of three peaks can be interpreted as a consequence of the changing
role of DBFs in the networking processes. The first peak is caused by DBFs playing the role
of translators supporting the LDFs in their efforts to overcome the gap between their dominant
knowledge orientation and the upcoming new knowledge base in biotechnology. The second
peak has to be characterized as an intermediate phase, with some DBFs who have already
become vertically integrated producers and LDFs still mainly concerned with building up
competencies in the new field. The third wave in networking then is caused by a tremendous
growth in the technological opportunity space, where networking is considered to be a strategy
to cope with the speed and complexity of technological development. In this phase DBFs play
the role of explorers allowing the large and established firms to explore a wider range of
technological approaches within biotechnology.
5. Conclusions
This paper provides a simulation analysis of the evolution of innovation networks in the
biotechnology based industries. Since this is an applied simulation exercise, a great emphasis
is placed on the characteristic features of this industry. Obviously the implementation of the
model in the sense of a history friendly model is not an easy endeavor. The first step therefore
was to analyze a prototypical case which allows to detect the interactions of the numerous
mechanisms and interactions.
In a second step the results of the simulations are compared to developments of the real world
by applying concepts of graph theory which provide us with some measurements of the
overall network dynamics. Although there are still some significant differences between the
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artifical evolution of network structures and the real world networks, the results look
promising as they are able to reproduce at least qualitatively some developments which are
observed in reality. The next steps have to be to balance the different mechanisms and to find
relative weights in accordance to their specific impacts. Once such weights were attributed,
different scenarios could be analyzed, showing the influence of different environments as well
as of policy measures aiming at the establishment of these new biotechnology-based
industries.
One final remark with respect to the stochastic influence of innovation processes on results
seems to be necessary. By repeating the simulation experiment several times the Poisson-
distributed random number, responsible for the innovation event leads to varying relationships
between the firms in our sample. However, although collaboration partners change the overall
network dynamics do not depend on stochastic influences, but remain rather stable over a
large number of simulation experiments performed in a Monte-Carlo-method fashion..
To summarize, in our research we started from the empirical literature and from the existing
case studies on the biotechnology-based sectors and developed a formal representation of
innovation networks that, while abstract, matched a number of the observed features of
innovation in these sectors. Going through this analytical exercise has significantly sharpened
our theoretical understanding of the key factors behind the development of networking in the
biotechnology-based sectors and contributed to a more general understanding of innovation
networks in other sectors.
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